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I. INTRODUCTION 
The tide of piracy off the coast of Somalia has ebbed according to 
recent statistics.
1
 Perhaps it is just in time. Three decisions involving 
pirates, who were found to be deprived of their human rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Mauritius and a Danish law, 
are rather troubling in at least two different ways: (1) These decisions set 
pirates free after they were brought to justice; and (2), which is more 
problematic, pirates may now be subject to summary execution because of 
frustrated governments and innocent seafarers. This Article will explore 
these three recent decisions and then put them into context with (a) what 
has been happening historically with sea piracy off the coast of Somalia 
(an 1,800-mile coastline);
2
 and (b) the reason for the current decline in the 
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 1. ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS—2014 ANNUAL 
REPORT 29 (Jan. 2015), available at http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
01/2014-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report-ABRIDGED.pdf [hereinafter PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY 
AGAINST SHIPS]. The figures represented in the IMB report show “a continued and welcome decrease 
in reported attacks for the fourth consecutive year.” Id. Your authors would like to thank the IMB for 
their statistics, which have been most helpful and utilized throughout this Article. 
 2. Robert I. Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for 
Action, in WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION (2010), available at http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/ 
files/WPF_PolicyBriefno11RotbergMaritimePiracy.pdf [hereinafter Combating Maritime Piracy].  
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number of acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. A recommendation will 
be made concerning the trying of pirates aboard a United Nations (UN) 
sanctioned vessel. The question is whether any country will want to go 
through the time and expense of bringing these pirates back to their 
homelands for justice. A further question is whether more pirates will be 
killed as a result of these decisions.  
The ECHR recently decided the cases of Ali Samatar and Others v. 
France
3
 and Hassan and Others v. France.
4
 The ECHR held unanimously, 
in two separate instances, that nine Somali nationals (pirates) who 
hijacked French registered vessels off the 1800 mile coast of Somalia; and 
who were later arrested, held by the French army, transferred to France, 
taken into police custody, and subsequently tried as pirates under French 
law; should be released and given compensation in thousands of Euros.
5
 
Looking at the facts of Ali Samatar and Others v. France, the pirates were 
prosecuted in France for acts of piracy resulting from an attack on a cruise 
ship flying a French flag.
6
 A dozen men armed with assault rifles and 
rocket launchers intercepted the cruise ship.
7
 These men seized the cruise 
ship, took its crew of thirty (including twenty French nationals), and 
headed to the Somali coast.
8
 As a reaction to these acts of piracy, the 
French government persuaded the Somali Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) to authorize the French to enter into Somali territorial 
waters in order to take all necessary measures—including appropriate use 
of force.
9
 The French hostages were released on April 11, 2008, seven 
days after the initial hijacking.
10
  
Once the pirates were detained, the Somali authorities apparently gave 
their permission to fly the prisoners to France.
11
 The prisoners were 
 
 
 3. Ali Samatar and Others v. France, (Judgment), App. No. 17110/10 and 17301/10, Eru. 2014 
Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-148290# 
{“itemid”:[“001-148290”]}.  
 4. Hassan and Others v. France, (Judgment), App. No. 46695/10 and 54588/10, Eru.2014 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“fulltext”:[“hassanandothersv.france”], 
“languageisocode”:[“FRE”],”documentcollectionid2”:[“GRANDCHAMBER”,”CHAMBER”],”itemid” 
:[“001-148289”]}. 
 5. Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, Suspects of Piracy Against 
French Vessels, Apprehended in Somalia by the French Authorities, Should Have Been Brought 
Before a Legal Authority as Soon as They Arrived in France, Apr. 12, 2014 (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Suspects of Piracy Against French Vessels]. 
 6. Ali Samatar and Others, supra note 3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
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transported on a military aircraft that departed on April 15 at 3 p.m. and 
landed in France at around 5:15 p.m. on April 16.
12
 Once the prisoners 
landed, they were taken into police custody on April 16.
13
 On the morning 
of April 18, they were taken before an investigating judge and placed 
under judicial investigation.
14
 Going into further detail, the investigation 
division of the Paris Court of Appeals discussed the events leading to their 
arrest in Somali territory and their detention; and held, in a judgment dated 
April 6, 2009, that the proceedings were lawful.
15
 After exhausting their 
appeals in the French courts, the applicants appealed to the ECHR, which 
held unanimously that there was a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
16
  
 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Suspects of Piracy Against French Vessels, supra note 5. Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states:  
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:  
 (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;  
 (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a 
court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;  
 (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence 
or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing 
after having done so;  
 (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or 
his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;  
 (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;  
 (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry 
into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation 
or extradition.  
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, 
of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.  
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this 
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. 
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.  
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and 
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.  
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions 
of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.  
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ 
Convention_ENG.pdf [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Human Rights]. 
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Regarding the companion French case of Hassan and Others, there 
were three Somali nationals, whose years of birth were given apparently to 
show that they were of age.
17
 They were prosecuted in France for acts of 
piracy committed in 2008.
18
 On September 2, 2008, the three pirates 
intercepted Carré d’As, a French yacht.19 The three pirates obliged the 
crew and a French couple to change course in order to join their other 
vessels.
20
 Once they joined the other vessels, about ten pirates boarded the 
yacht, which reached the coast of Somalia that evening.
21
 The couple were 
robbed of their possessions and then held hostage for two million dollars.
22
 
On September 5, a French naval frigate arrived on the scene with a team of 
commandos.
23
  
Abiding by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816,
24
 the 
French naval frigate carried out its attack on September 16.
25
 Once the 
operation to free the hostages commenced and the pirates were arrested, 
the pirates were in Somali territorial water.
26
 After their arrest, the pirates 
were placed under military guard on the French naval frigate.
27
 They were 
held on board until September 22, 2008.
28
 After the Somali authorities 
agreed on September 21 to the transfer of the six Somali suspects, the 
applicants were then taken to a Djibouti military base pending their 
transfer to France on September 21.
29
 They were put on a military plane on 
September 23, 2008 and arrived in France on the same day at around 4 
p.m.
30
 The crux of the human rights problem, as far as the ECHR was 
concerned, was that they were held in police custody until September 25 at 
2:30 p.m. Later on September 25, one of the suspected pirates was brought 
 
 
 17. Hassan and Others, supra note 4. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. S.C. Res. 1816, para. 20-22, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1816 (June 2, 2008). On June 2, 2008, the 
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution (1816), which authorized (for a six-month period) 
States, that wished to cooperate with the Somali TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery off 
of the cost of Somalia, to enter Somali’s territorial waters and use all available means to repel acts of 
piracy and armed robbery. Id. In fact, the resolution was interpreted to allow affected governments to 
go on land and use Somali’s territorial waters as well. Suspects of Piracy Against French Vessels, 
supra note 5.  
 25. Hassan and Others, supra note 4. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss2/5
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before an investigating judge in the afternoon at 5:54 pm.
31
 The other two 
suspects were brought before an investigating judge at 7:30 p.m. and 8:09 
p.m. the same day.
32
  
An examining judge placed them under judicial investigation and 
remanded them back into custody.
33
 The French court specifically held 
that their arrest and detention, pending placement in police custody, had 
not breached Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
That court reached its decision due to the “wholly exceptional 
circumstances” of the case in temporal and geographic terms.34 The 
appellate court, the Court of Cassation, dismissed the applications on 
appeal.
35
 The prisoners ultimately filed complaints with the ECHR.
36
 The 
ECHR held unanimously, that there had been: 
a violation of Article 5 ¶ 1 (a right to liberty and security) of the 
European Convention of Human Rights in the case of Hassan and 
Others because the French system applicable at the relevant time 
had not sufficiently guaranteed the applicants’ rights to their liberty 
. . . a violation of Article 5 ¶ 3 (right to liberty and security) in both 
cases, as the applicants had been taken into custody for forty-eight 
hours on their arrivals and in France instead of being brought 
“promptly” before a legal authority when they have already been 
deprived of their liberty for four days and some twenty hours (Ali 
Samatar and Others) and six days and sixteen hours (Hassan and 
Others).
37
 
The court, in its opinion, reiterated that the purpose of Article 5 ¶ 3 is to 
facilitate the detection of any ill treatment and to minimize any unjustified 
interference with individual liberty. This is done in order to protect 
individuals by means of an automatic initial review within a strict time 
frame that leaves little flexibility in interpretation.
38
 The court cited 
precedential cases that delineated the Article 5 ¶ 3 promptness 
requirement; those cases allowed for a period of two to three days between 
 
 
 31. Id. Only three of the six suspected pirates brought suit before the ECHR. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. §§ 23–24. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Suspects of Piracy Against French Vessels, supra note 5. Article 5 of the ECHR, supra note 
16.  
 38. Id. 
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a defendant’s arrest and initial court appearance.39 The Article was not 
designed to give the authorities the opportunity to intensify investigations 
for the purpose of bringing formal charges against the suspects.
40
  
The ECHR awarded damages in both cases. The EHCR awarded 
€5,000 in the case of Hassan and Others as non-pecuniary damage and 
€7,272.46 to Abdulhai Guelleh Ahmed for costs and expenses.41 In Ali 
Samatar and Others the ECHR gave €2,000 to each of the applicants as 
non-pecuniary damages and for costs and expenses.
42
 The ECHR also gave 
an award of €9,000 to Abdurahman Ali Samatar, together with €6,000 
jointly to Ismael Ali Samatar et al and €3,000 to Abdulqader Guled Said.43  
Much of the criticism of the EHCR decision concerns the fact that the 
ECHR apparently added insult to injury by awarding thousands of Euros 
to the pirates after they had received a two-million-Euro ransom in order 
to release the hostages.
44
 However, at least two of the defendants were 
found not guilty by the French court but only after having been held in 
custody for four years with the others arrested.
45
 These innocent men were 
taken into custody after leaving the port in some vehicle, but they were 
never proven to have been aboard the cruise ship on which the acts of 
piracy were perpetrated.
46
  
In Police v Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader and Others,
47
 a case decided 
prior to Hassan in December 2014, the twelve accused pirates were 
charged with “acts of piracy on the high seas” in breach of certain sections 
of the Piracy and Maritime Violence Act of 2011 of Mauritius.
48
 The 
twelve men who were accused of piracy were found on “the high seas 
around 240 nautical Miles off the Somali Coast . . .” after allegedly 
“willfully and unlawfully commit[ting] an act of piracy . . . an illegal act 
 
 
 39. Hassan and Others, supra note 4. See also Medvedyev and Others v. France (No. 3394/03, 
ECHR, Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR 
&id=001-97979&filename=001-97979.pdf; Vassis and Others v. France (No. 62736/09, June 6, 2013), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-122306&filename 
=001-122306.pdf&TID=ihgdqbxnfi.  
 40. Id. See Medvedyev and Others, supra note 39; Vassis and Others, supra note 39.  
 41. Suspects of Piracy Against French Vessels, supra note 5.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally Somali Pirates Win Compensation After Errors in Procedure, HANDY 
SHOPPING GUIDE, Dec. 5, 2014, http://handyshippingguide.com/shipping-news/somali-pirates-win-
compensation-after-errors-in-procedure_6016 [hereinafter Somali Pirates Win Compensation].  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Police v. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader (no. 850/2013, § 1, 2014).  
 48. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss2/5
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of violence” against a certain ship that was proceeding from Oman to 
Kenya.
49
  
The Intermediate Court of Mauritius stated that the “rights guaranteed 
to the people of Mauritius under the European Convention were rights 
which, on independence, have existed and shall continue to exist” within 
terms of Section 3.
50
 Under Mauritius law, the application of rights 
granted by the European Convention is a significant interpretive issue 
because “while Mauritius is no longer a party of the European Convention 
or bound by its terms, the Strasbourg jurisprudence gives persuasive 
guidance on the content of the rights, which the people have enjoyed and 
should continue to enjoy. . . .”51 The court invoked Article 5(1) of the 
Constitution of Mauritius, which reads as follows:  
 (1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may 
be authorised by law – . . . (e) upon reasonable suspicion of his 
having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence 
. . . .
52
 
According to the court, the corresponding provision under the ECHR is 
Article 5, namely:  
 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No 
one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and 
 
 
 49. Id.; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/ 
unclos/unclos_e.pdf.  
 50. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 125. Article 3 of the Mauritius Constitution 
reads:  
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Mauritius there have existed and shall continue to 
exist without discrimination by reason of race, place of origin, political opinions, color, creed 
or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, 
each and all of the following human rights and fundamental freedoms—(a) the right of the 
individual to life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law; (b) freedom of 
conscience, of expression, of assembly and association and freedom to establish schools; and 
(c) the right of the individual to protection for the privacy of his home and other property and 
from deprivation of property without compensation, and the provisions of this chapter shall 
have effect for the purpose of affording protection to those rights and freedoms subject to 
such limitations of that protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations 
designed to ensure that the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms by any individual does not 
prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.  
Constitution of Mauritius, Mar. 12, 1968, art. 3.  
 51. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 125. Strasbourg jurisprudence refers to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence. David Campbell, Human Rights and 
the Critique of the Common Law Human Rights and the End of Empire, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 791, 795 
n.18 (2005). This is due to the fact that the institutions established under the ECHR were based in 
Strasbourg. Id.  
 52. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 127. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: . . . (c) the lawful 
arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of 
having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent his committing an offense or fleeing after 
having done so . . . .
53
 
The important point derived from Article 5 is that it protects individuals 
not only by requiring that the state comply with the substantive and 
procedural rules of the laws concerned, “but it also requires that any 
deprivation of liberty be compatible with the purpose of Article 5, namely, 
to protect the individual from arbitrariness . . . .”54 
The Intermediate Court of Mauritius also looked at present laws of 
Mauritius under which “the twelve accused were detained and . . . found 
no provisions regarding contact with a lawyer or family.”55 “[I]n short, 
these twelve persons were kept completely incommunicado during their 
several days on board [the ship], based on domestic French laws 
mentioned by the commander. Thus it is unclear whether the detention 
was, in fact, non-arbitrary.”56 
The court then turned to review Article V Section 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (as part of the framework of guarantees).
57
 
The article is concerned with two separate matters.
58
 First the article looks 
to “the early stages following an arrest, when an individual is taken into 
the power of the authorities,” and second to the “period pending any trial 
before a criminal court, during which the suspect may be detained or 
released with or without conditions.”59 
The Intermediate Court of Mauritius also looked at the “promptness” of 
the appearance of the arrested individual.
60
 Promptness is important to 
“allow detection of any ill-treatment and to keep to a minimum any 
unjustified interference with individual liberty . . . .”61 The exception to the 
notion of “promptness” that is required under Article 5 ¶ 3 of the 
 
 
 53. Id. § 128. Article 5 of the ECHR, supra note 16. 
 54. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 129.  
 55. Id. § 132.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 133.  
 60. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 133. 
 61. Id. It will be recalled, that in Hassan v. France the French police did not follow their own 
procedures and did not bring the prisoners involved within forty-eight hours according to French law. 
See Hassan and Others, supra note 4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss2/5
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Convention is limited to “wholly exceptional circumstances” that would 
justify a delay in a court’s applying its own procedural rules.62 In the case 
sub judice, the French had refused to try the twelve persons, so there was 
no question of bringing them back to France for trial.
63
 There was no proof 
of the sea conditions’ being rough, which would have given a reason to 
prevent the swift navigation by a French vessel to the nearest port or 
harbor.
64
 The ECHR stated that the twelve accused parties could have been 
brought to land within a shorter amount of time if they were taken to 
Kenya, Seychelles, or Mauritius.
65
 In concluding, the court held that the 
prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the twelve 
defendants were guilty of the elements of “high seas,” “illegal acts of 
violence,” and withholding of information “for private ends.”66  
In summary, the Court’s reasoning for releasing the twelve pirates due 
to human rights violations was because of the State’s failure to prosecute 
the pirates promptly. Article 5 of the ECHR requires that when an arrested 
person is detained, that person must be promptly placed under judicial 
control, in order to prevent ill treatment of the person arrested.
67
 In this 
case, the French took too long to allow the accused to appear in court, and 
there were no “wholly exceptional circumstances” to justify the delay.68 
Before proceeding any further with human rights issues with regard to 
the treatment of captured pirates and the applicable laws, it is important to 
get a perspective on what has happened with regard to the number of 
incidents of piracy and prosecutions, in the past as well as the current state 
of affairs. The reader will observe a sharp decline in the number of piracy 
incidents off of the coast of Somalia.
69
  
 
 
 62. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 133. 
 63. Id. § 135.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 140. According to UNCLOS, Piracy consists 
of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private 
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on 
the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such 
ship or air-craft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of 
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or 
of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).  
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 49, at 60–61. 
 67. Mohamed Ali Abdeoulkader, supra note 47, § 133. 
 68. Id. § 136. See Appendix I for a list of violations by Article and State in 2014.  
 69. STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/250867/number-of-actual-and-attempted-piracy-
attacks-in-somalia/ (last visited May 21, 2015). The statistic represents the total number of actual and 
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224 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:215 
 
 
 
 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA AND ITS 
RELATION TO THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Piracy is defined in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Armed Robbery is defined by 
Resolution A.1025 (26) of the International Maritime Organization’s 
(IMO) twenty-sixth assembly session.
70
 Article 101 of UNCLOS defines 
Piracy as:  
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on 
the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or air-craft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, 
persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of 
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or 
aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
71
  
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), “trends” show that 
there were a total of 245 incidents of armed robbery and piracy reported to 
the IMB Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) for the year 2014.
72
 This was a 
decline in the number piracy attacks for the fourth consecutive year.
73
 The 
2014 incidents were broken down as “183 vessels boarded, 28 attempted 
attacks, 21 hijackings, and 13 vessels fired upon. Some 442 crewmembers 
have been taken hostage, thirteen injured, nine kidnapped from their 
vessels, and four killed.”74 Nearly all these figures come from Southeast 
Asia and Indonesia: six vessels hijacked in the South China Sea; forty-one 
in West Africa, mostly off of Nigeria; and numerous piracy incidents at 
other locations. The IMB was concerned enough about human right issues 
to think it necessary to include a page on human rights and piracy.
75
 
The IMB pointed out the obvious fact that acts of piracy occur far 
enough away from the reach of law enforcement agencies as to make it 
 
 
attempted piracy attacks in Somalian territorial waters from 2008 to 2014. The statistics your authors 
are about to show indicate a decline in piracy.  
 70. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 49, at 60–61. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, supra note 1, at 29. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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impossible for those agencies to respond as the crime unfolds.
76
 It is 
impossible to get prompt forensic examination because there are no 
resources available.
77
 Law enforcement agencies can take statements, but 
it is almost impossible to preserve the rest of the evidence.
78
 In addition, it 
is difficult to obtain eyewitnesses who will be available to testify because 
they have sailed away on their vessels or were hijacked, only to spend 
many long months or years in captivity under appalling conditions.
79
 
Finally, according to the IMB, suspected pirates are released only to return 
to Somalia to reequip and resume their pirate activities.
80
 The IMB 
believes that the ECHR decisions on human rights violations will only 
lead to further human right violations.
81
 However, this time the violations 
will be committed against innocent people aboard vessels, rather than the 
pirates.
82
 
The problem with these three decisions is not the fact that the court 
ruled the way it did so much as the fact as it may discourage European 
Navies from taking future actions against pirates along international sea 
routes.
83
 This article will later observe that the armed guards aboard ships 
 
 
 76. Id. at 31. For examples of cases demonstrating the law enforcements’ inability to respond as 
the crime of piracy unfolds see Ali Samatar and Others, supra note 3; Hassan and Others, supra note 
4. In the Ali Samatar and Others case, the cruise ship was boarded, seized, and made it into the 
territorial waters of Somalia before the French navy was able to intercept the pirates. Ali Samatar and 
Others, supra note 3. In the Hassan and Others case, the yacht and its occupants were captured on 
September 2 and the French navy did not arrive to the scene till September 5. Hassan and Others, 
supra note 4. 
 77. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, supra note 1, at 31. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. On March 1, 2015 New York Times wrote that pirates finally freed four fishermen that 
were held captive in Somalia for nearly five years longer than any other hostages seized off the Somali 
coast. Mohammed Ibrahim, Pirates Free 4 Fishermen In Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2015, at A8. 
The United Nations got involved in procuring their release. Id. The Thais that were released were 
among twenty-four members of a Taiwanese flagged fishing vessel that was seized April 2010. Id. 
Fourteen sailors, all from Myanmar, were released a year later and six others died of various illnesses, 
according to a statement released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Id. 
The pirates had used a vessel as a mother ship, which was captured in 2011. Id. This happened to be 
the longest captivity endured by any hostages of Somali pirates. Id. However, Somali pirates are still 
holing twenty-six hostages who were abducted from another fishing vessel in March 2012. Id. 
 80. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, supra note 1, at 31. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. In May of 2010, ten suspected Somali pirates were captured and then released in an 
inflatable boat without navigational equipment. Russian Navy ‘Sent Somali Pirates to their Death’, 
THE WEEK, May 12, 2010, available at http://www.theweek.co.uk/politics/14701/russian-navy-’sent-
somali-pirates-their-death’. These ten suspected pirates are thought to have died because contact with 
the boat’s radio beacon was lost within the hour after setting them adrift. Id. Colonel Alexei 
Kuznetzov released the pirates due to the “imperfections in international law” and using the reasoning 
of “Why should we feed some pirates?” Id.  
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might execute the pirates preemptively, rather than arresting and holding 
them for trial.  
The following diagram depicts the actual attempted piracy attacks 
originating from Somalia between the years 2008 and 2014. 
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF ACTUAL AND ATTEMPTED PIRACY ATTACKS IN 
SOMALIA FROM 2008 TO 2014
84
  
 
It can be seen from the diagram that the number of actual and 
attempted pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia increased and are now 
finally on a downward trend. In this regard, there was a think-tank at the 
Harvard Kennedy Center, to which this author was invited, in December 
2009.
85
 There were twenty-five persons in attendance at the think-tank.
86
 
The idea was to have presentations on what to do about the steep rise in 
piracy off of the Somali coastline.
87
 Those present included experts on 
piracy, a few academics, retired and active admirals and naval captains, a 
representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a representative from 
 
 
 84. STATISTA, supra note 69. The statistic represents the total number of actual and attempted 
piracy attacks in Somalian territorial waters from 2008 to 2014. 
 85. Combating Maritime Piracy, supra note 2, at 3. The findings and conclusion of that 
discussion were edited and assembled by our host, Professor Robert I. Robert. The findings and 
conclusions appear at STATISTA, supra note 69.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
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Swedish intelligence, Mrs. Hillary Clinton’s assistant at the U.S. State 
Department, former ambassadors to Somalia, a security company 
(C.E.O.), and persons on the ground in Somalia.
88
  
At that time in December 2009, as can be seen from Table 1, the 
number of pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia had jumped from 
nineteen in 2008 to eighty in 2009.
89
 The idea behind the think tank was to 
create and recommend ideas regarding matters such as providing security 
for ships and their crews, assisting the government of Somalia, and 
strengthening the legal response.
90
 One question that was asked was “what 
to do with captured pirates and confiscated ships” because there were a 
“variety of national legal approaches” to the piracy problem at that time, 
and there were “diverse views amongst nations on international law 
regarding” whether universal jurisdiction gave each State the necessary 
precedent to try pirates.
91
 It was pointed out at this meeting that some of 
the Sates at the time were weary of imprisoning and trying pirates for 
various reasons.
92
 For example, it would look ill for countries that were 
predominantly European to try persons of color for piracy.  
There was also the problem of where to transport the captured pirates. 
At the time, Kenya was trying certain pirates, and there was a prison in 
Mombasa that held 119 pirates, ten of whom had been convicted.
93
 Other 
nations were just catching and releasing pirates because they did not have 
any domestic municipal laws on the subject of piracy and did not wish to 
get involved with pirates’ serving time in prison and then asking for 
asylum after their sentences.
94
  
It was pointed out at the think-tank sessions that there was no domestic 
or international legal impediment “to trying pirates locally or regionally, in 
existing or specially created tribunals.”95 Almost everyone present at the 
meeting agreed “that there were ample legal resources for the trial [of 
pirates]” and “there was no excuse . . . not to prosecute [them].”96 So the 
group of experts recommended: First, the possible creation of an “extra-
territorial court,” which would use Somali law and possibly be based in 
“Somaliland, in Djibouti, or elsewhere in the region, to handle all pirate 
 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. STATISTA, supra note 69.  
 90. Combating Maritime Piracy, supra note 2, at 4.  
 91. Id. at 10. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 11. 
 96. Combating Maritime Piracy, supra note 2, at 11. 
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cases.”97 The African Union (AU) or the UN would have to authorize the 
court and the procedures.
98
 There would also have to be a prison system 
established, which would be rather expensive but necessary.
99
  
The second point made at the conference was to use “Kenya as a court 
of first jurisdiction for piracy cases,” although there was a “backlog of 
cases, procedural shortcomings, legal questions, and the short-handedness 
of the Kenyan prosecutorial and judicial staffs.”100 The other possibility 
was using Tanzania, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and other countries that 
would volunteer to have pirates tried in their own court system.
101
 It was 
suggested that UN Resolution 1897 be expanded to make the “existence of 
equipment capable of being [used] for purpose of piracy prima facie 
evidence of piratical intent.”102 This of course was due to the fact that we 
were concerned about pirates’ receiving a fair trial. We were also 
concerned with finding a proper way to preserve evidence. Evidence such 
as mother ships and other pirate vessels, grappling hooks and ladders, 
other types of specialized equipment, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 
and machine guns could all be confiscated at sea.
103
 But they could also be 
dropped overboard before capture, making the possible evidence disappear 
into the sea. In order to expand upon UN Resolution 1897, an agreement 
would be necessary among the “UN Security Council and countries 
around the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian 
Ocean.”104 This agreement would “harmonize[] their rules regarding 
bringing weapons aboard merchant vessels into port.”105  
Finally, there was a suggestion that the 1988 Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation
106
 (SUA) be expanded, as well as the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.
107
 It was 
thought that if these updates took place, then there would be a 
 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Combating Maritime Piracy, supra note 2, at 11. See Appendix III for UN Resolution 1897. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. Today, most of these weapons are left on floating platforms; supposedly there are thirty-
three of them operational in the world today.  
 106. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 
1678 U.N.T.S. 201, 27 I.L.M. 668, Mar. 10, 1988, available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/ 
conventions/Conv8.pdf. 
 107. Combating Maritime Piracy, supra note 2, at 11. 
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strengthening of “international legal codes concerning and permitting the 
prosecution of pirates and pirate financiers.”108  
At the time of the Harvard meeting in December 2009 and for a while 
after, it was obvious that there were practical limitations on prosecution, 
including a lack of trained lawyers and judges as well as adequate prisons. 
Where could pirates be prosecuted? Where could pirates be prosecuted 
given the limited amount of time and resources available to carry out 
actual capture and trial? 
The lack of judicial trial capacity and lack of prison capacity created 
legal issues that would contribute to human rights violations. This is due to 
the fact that the treatment of captured pirates was considered a very minor 
issue on the international scale compared to the number of problems they 
had been causing and the number of people they had been injuring by their 
acts.
109
 There were conventional considerations concerning human rights 
other than UNCLOS.  
The European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) applies 
to people within the effective control of any state that is a member of the 
ECHR, which consists of all the member states of the Council of Europe 
(currently forty-seven).
110
 Other relevant treaties include the UN 
Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
111
 Issues that come up, as seen by the cases already 
mentioned, include “the length of time [prisoners] can be detained, 
humane treatment, right to a fair trial, and prison conditions.”112 The 
 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Arabella Thorp, Preventing and Prosecuting Piracy at Sea: Legal Issues, HOUSE OF 
COMMON LIBRARIES, Feb. 28, 2012, available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06237 
[hereinafter Preventing and Prosecuting Pirates at Sea]. 
 110. Id. Questions & Answers, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Documents/Questions_Answers_ENG.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2015). See also European Convention 
on Human Rights, art. 1, June 2010, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ 
ENG.pdf.  
 111. Preventing and Prosecuting Pirates at Sea, supra note 109, at 16. United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 
10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988). The desire of the United Nations General Assembly had 
when it adopted this treaty was “to make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.” Id. International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Article 7 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” Id. art. 7.  
 112. Preventing and Prosecuting Pirates at Sea, supra note 109, at 17. See Appendix I. The chart 
sets forth violations by Article and by State for the year 2014.  
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potential human rights issues for holding pirates at sea can be complex and 
nuanced:  
For those states which are parties to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, there is no legal problem with their public vessels 
holding pirates on board for the purpose of taking them to a proper 
jurisdiction for arrest and prosecution. There may, however, be a 
problem in relation to the holding of pirates on their own vessels, 
and not allowing them to go, for the purpose of disruption of piracy, 
rather than of detention for prosecution.
113
  
The ECHR held in the cases of Rigopoulos and Medveyev that under 
Article 5(3) of the ECHR, “long periods of detention are not compatible 
. . .”114 The ECHR called for a “legal framework for detention at sea.”115 
Countries such as Germany, Kenya, Russia, and Spain “have 
constitutional limits of one or two days from capture to appearance before 
a judge.”116 In addition, pirates that are captured should be treated under 
international human rights standards.
117
 Capturing countries should make 
certain that trials and prisons in the countries in which they transfer 
suspected pirates meet these standards; otherwise, the capturing country 
could breach its own human rights obligations.
118
 An example of these 
difficulties was highlighted in a Danish case: 
The Danish Navy ship Absalon on 17 September 2008 captured 10 
pirates in the waters off Somalia. After six days’ detention and the 
confi[]scation of their weapons, ladders, and other implements used 
to board ships, the Danish government decided to free the pirates by 
putting them ashore on a Somali beach. The Danish authorities had 
come to the conclusion that the pirates risked torture and the death 
penalty if [they] surrendered to (whatever) Somali authorities. This 
was unacceptable, as Danish law prohibits the extradition of 
criminals when they may face the death penalty. Moreover, they 
were not ready to try them in Denmark as it would be difficult (in 
light of the possible abuses they would risk) to deport them back to 
Somalia after their sentences were served. It is clear that human 
rights considerations, or perhaps reasons of expediency presented as 
 
 
 113. Preventing and Prosecuting Pirates at Sea, supra note 109, at 17.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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human rights concerns, prevailed over considerations concerning 
the fight against piracy.
119
 
In the end, a Danish judge threw out the case against pirates for lack of 
promptness. More important, the question has been raised at different 
times as to whether the “right” persons are being prosecuted for piracy. 
The pirates who have been prosecuted, for the most part, were “the ‘foot 
soldiers’ rather than their superiors.”120 In Somalia, there were very few 
persons actually on top of the food chain with regard to sea pirates.
121
 
“Naval forces estimate that there are about 50 main pirate leaders, around 
300 leaders of pirate attack groups, and around 2,500 ‘foot soldiers.’ It is 
believed that financing is provided by around 10 to 20 individuals.”122 The 
Security Council Committee Monitoring Group on the Somalia weapons 
embargo “has identified not only the key leaders of pirate militias and 
networks, but also their location and political connections.”123 Many of 
them were reportedly in Somalia.
124
  
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) created a 
“piracy prosecution model.”125 According to the UNODC, the regional 
prosecution model has been “an innovative criminal justice response to 
piracy.”126 The UNODC program provided several suggestions to regional 
prosecuting States:  
Legislative implementation and reform; facilitating the signing of 
transfer agreements between prosecuting States and naval forces, as 
well as re-transfer agreements for sentenced prisoners; building, 
renovating, and upgrading police, prison, and court facilities; 
enhancing law enforcement and correctional services at the strategic 
level; monitoring and enhancing detention facilities; the provision 
of welfare support and interpretation services to piracy suspects 
detained on remand; the placement of in-house police, prosecution 
and prison mentors into national agencies; provision of vehicles and 
specialist equipment to law enforcement bodies; and wide-ranging 
 
 
 119. Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of 
Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399, 408–09 (2009).  
 120. Preventing and Prosecuting Pirates at Sea, supra note 109, at 18.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the Establishment of Specialized 
Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, June 21, 2011, at Annex I.  
 123. Preventing and Prosecuting Pirates at Sea, supra note 109, at 18. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Maritime Crime Programme—Indian Ocean, UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ 
piracy/indian-ocean-division.html (last visited May 21, 2015). 
 126. Id. 
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training initiatives for lawyers, Judges, Police, Coast Guards and 
Prison officials.
127
 
In addition, the Maritime Crime Programmee (MPC) provides 
“[t]ranscription services for trials; [f]unding for defense lawyers 
representing suspected pirates; [c]ourtroom translation [and] interpretation 
services; []costs associate[ed] with flying foreign civilian witnesses (e.g. 
seafarers) to the prosecuting [state] to testify in person; [and] [e]quipment 
for video-teleconferencing of foreign witnesses unable to testify in 
person.”128 
The UNODC set forth a list of piracy prosecution statistics.  
TABLE 2: PIRACY PROSECUTION STATISTICS AT OCTOBER 2014
129
 
SOMALI PIRACY PRISONERS—KENYA 
Status Detained By Number of Prisoners (Sentence)  Total 
On Remand Denmark 4 4 On remand 
Convicted Denmark 24 160 Tried 
  EUNAVFOR (Spain) 4 (7 years) 143 Convicted  
  EUNAVFOR (Germany) 9 (5 years) 101 Remaining in Kenya 
  United States 7 (4 years) 42 Post-sentence repatriations 
  United States 9 (5 years) 10 in 2011 
  EUNAVFOR (Sweden) 7 (7 years) 7 to Puntland in November 2013 
  EUNAVFOR (Germany) 7 (20 years) 7 to Puntland in January 2014 
  EUNAVFOR (France) 11 (5 years)* 7 + 11 to Puntland in February 
2014 
  United States 10 (8 years) Sentence complete   
  United Kingdom 8 (10 years)   
  EUNAVFOR (Germany) 7 (5 years) Sentence complete   
  EUNAVFOR (Spain) 7 (5 years)   
  EUNAVFOR (France) 11 (20 years)   
  United Kingdom 6 (5 years)   
  EUNAVFOR (Spain) 7 (4.5 years) Sentence complete   
  EUNAVFOR (Italy) 9 (7 years)   
Acquitted  United States 17 17 Acquitted  
      17 Repatriated in December 
2010 
 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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SOMALI PIRACY PRISONERS—SEYCHELLES 
Status Detained By Number of Prisoners (Sentence)  Total 
On Remand EUNAVFOR (France) 5 14 On remand 
  Denmark 9   
Convicted Denmark 4 (3 x 24 years, 1 x 16 years) 133 Tried 
  Denmark 4 (3 x 21 years, 1 x 14 years) 129 Convicted  
  Netherlands 6 (5 x 24 years, 1 x 12 years) 22 Remaining in Seychelles 
  Netherlands 11 (6 x 16 yrs, 3 x 5 yrs, 1 x 4 yrs, 1 
x 1.5 yrs) 
 
  EUNAVFOR (France) 11 (6 years) 96 Prisoner transfers 
  EUNAVFOR (Spain) 11 (10 years) 17 to Somaliland Mar 12 
  EUNAVFOR 
(Netherlands) 
9 (7 x 6 years), 2 x juvenile acquitted 12 to Somaliland Dec 12 
  Seychelles Coastguard 11 (10 years) 5 to Puntland Dec 12 
    10 (20 years) 25 to Puntland Mar 13 
    6 (24 years) 8 to Puntland May 13 
    5 (18 years) 11 to Puntland Oct 13 
    9 (8 x 22 years, 1 x juvenile 
acquitted) 
18 to Puntland March 14 
  United Kingdom 7 (6 x 7 years, 1 x 2 years) 11 Post-sentence 
repatriations 
  United Kingdom 14 (3 x 2.5 years, 8 x 12 years, 1 x 
pleaded 
1 to Puntland Aug 12 
    guilty 10 years, 1 x juvenile time 
served, 
5 to Puntland Oct 13 
    1 x juvenile acquitted) 3 to Puntland May 14 
  United States 15 (13 x 18 years, 2 x 4 years) 2 to Puntland Oct 14 
Acquitted  United Kingdom 1 4 Acquitted  
  Seychelles Coastguard 1 4 Repatriations after acquittal 
  EUNAVFOR 
(Netherlands) 
2 1 to Puntland Aug 12 
      1 to Puntland May 14 
      2 to Puntland Sept 14 
SOMALI PIRACY PRISONERS—MAURITIUS 
Status Detained By Number of Prisoners (Sentence)  Total 
On Remand EUNAVFOR (France) 12 12 On remand 
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These statistics will give the reader an idea of the number of 
prosecutions that have been undertaken in an attempt to deter acts of 
piracy. The goal is also to make certain that once the pirates serve their 
sentences, they are rehabilitated and sent back to Somalia. However, these 
prosecutions do not come free. The most important problem regarding 
human rights, as far as your authors are concerned, involves minimizing 
the burden of prosecuting pirates (i.e. so that ship owners and navy 
personnel do not become frustrated by illegal impediments and take the 
law into their own hands by covertly shooting and dumping the pirates at 
sea).  
III. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC COURSE OF 
MARITIME (SOMALIA) PIRACY AND MINIMIZING THE BURDEN OF 
PROSECUTING PIRATES 
The following chart gives a breakdown of the overall cost of maritime 
piracy. 
TABLE 3: THE ECONOMIC COST OF MARITIME (SOMALIA) PIRACY
130
 
 
As can be seen above, as of 2013, the World Bank estimated the 
economic cost of piracy off the coast of Somalia at $18 billion, with a 
margin of error of roughly US $6 billion. This is acting as a “hidden tax on 
 
 
 130. Maritime Piracy, Part I: An Overview of Trends, Cost, and Trade-Related Implications, 
UNITED NATIONS, 14 (2014). Gather the information from One Earth Future (OEF) (2013).  
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world trade, [and] reflects [] increased trade cost; it does not account for 
losses to tourism and fisheries, which are addressed separately.”131 
Turning to the cost of ransoms and their economic impact, Table 4 sets 
forth the evolution of ransoms collected by pirates.
132
 
TABLE 4: EVOLUTION OF RANSOMS: ANNUAL AMOUNTS COLLECTED 
BY SOMALI-BASED PIRATES IN RANSOMS FOR VESSELS AND/OR CREWS 
KIDNAPPED BETWEEN 2005 AND 2012
133
 
 
The ransom value is actually much higher, however, “as in addition to 
the ransomed amounts, there remain other associated costs, which are not 
accounted for, including the cost of ransom value negotiations and the 
 
 
 131. Id. at 14. Oceans Beyond Piracy published their 2014 report with the updated statistics 
regarding the cost of prosecutions and imprisonment of pirates. This chart represents the updated 
information: 
 
OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY REPORT 2014 21 (One Earth Future 
Foundation 2014).  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 16. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
236 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:215 
 
 
 
 
means used to deliver the ransom money.”134 As this value has increased, 
“so [has] the duration of negotiations and of captivity. Up from 55 days in 
2009, seafarers are now being held hostage for an average duration of 
three to four months.”135  
Even with the increased cost, pirates are considered and treated as 
criminals rather than combatants.
136
 Since pirates are not enemy 
combatants, the U.S. Navy and others are restricted on what they can and 
cannot do with regard to attacking and capturing pirates.
137
 For example, 
despite the fact that naval forces patrolling the Somali coast have an 
expanded legal mandate, they are not allowed to launch attacks on 
suspected pirates’ vessels until the pirates attempt to board another 
vessel.
138
 Thus, the navy’s actions are largely defensive.139 “Navies are 
also not allowed to pursue pirates to shore for fear of incurring civilian 
casualties”;140 however, in the case of Somalia, foreign naval forces have 
been given the authority to enter territorial waters.
141
  
It is difficult for navies to proceed because they are not accustomed to 
attacking pirates, but rather other warships.
142
 In other words, human 
rights concerns and safeguards impede their normal operations. Naval 
personnel are not trained to follow rules for pirates regarding apprehension 
procedures and evidence collection.
143
 They are uncertain of what 
“constitutes evidence of a piratical act or an attempt of the act . . . .”144 The 
boarding of a fishing vessel by skiffs (vessels pirates use) or the 
possession of an AK-47 may present problems for navies as far as 
gathering evidence is concerned.
145
 Under Article 110 of the UNCLOS, 
warships are permitted to board merchant ships suspected of being 
 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Debrah Osiro, Somali Pirates Have Rights Too: Judicial Consequences and Human Rights 
Concerns, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, at 7 (2011), available at https://www.issafrica.org/ 
uploads/Paper224SomaliPirates.pdf [hereinafter Somali Pirates Have Rights Too]. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1816 (June 2, 2008). This resolution allows States 
cooperating with TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery off of the cost of Somalia to enter 
into the territorial waters of Somalia or the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. Id.  
 142. See Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supra note 136, at 7.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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piratical in nature or transporting slaves.
146
 However, fishing skiffs, used 
by the Somalis, are not exactly what the navy personnel are accustomed to 
dealing with.
147
 This has, in a few instances, lead to an attempt to go back 
to the “good old days.”148 It becomes costly to have the burden of proving 
a piratical act, especially when human rights concerns are taken into 
account during trials. The trials, by definition, are not summary 
proceedings.  
“Equipment articles widen the scope of criminal liability by creating 
prima facie evidence that a vessel is a pirate ship.”149 This would mean 
that a crew could be found guilty of piracy if they are aware of the 
presence of certain specified equipment on board their ship (e.g. weapons, 
ladders, and grappling hooks, etc.).
150
 However, the weapons would be 
 
 
 146. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 110, Dec. 10, 1982 [hereinafter 
UNCLOS]. This article of the UNCLOS states that  
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which 
encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in 
accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable 
ground for suspecting that: 
 (a) the ship is engaged in piracy; 
 (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; 
 (c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has 
jurisdiction under article 109; 
 (d) the ship is without nationality; or 
 (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the 
same nationality as the warship. 
2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify the ship’s right 
to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an officer to the 
suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed 
to a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible 
consideration. 
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not 
committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may 
have been sustained. 
4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. 
5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft clearly marked 
and identifiable as being on government service. 
Id. 
 147. Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supra note 136, at 7. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. Equipment articles are regulations that construct a “judicial presumption of guilt on piracy 
charges for the crews of civilian vessels possessing certain specified equipment within a certain 
defined area of the high seas plagued by pirate attacks.” Eugene Kontorovich, Equipment Articles for 
the Prosecution of Maritime Piracy, Discussion Paper for One Earth Future Foundation, May 2010, 
http://www.oneearthfuture.org/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2015). The same approach is being used against 
drug traffickers. Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supra note 136, at 7. 
 150. Id. 
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thrown overboard at the first indication that a patrol ship is approaching 
them for boarding.
151
  
Over the years abuses have taken place, which is a known concern.
152
 
For example, the sinking of an alleged pirate vessel by the Indian Navy 
vessel Tabar, resulted in the death of fourteen people.
153
 At the time the 
Tabar officials claimed self-defense; that they were dealing with “a ‘pirate 
mothership’ in ‘description and intent’”; but that the “the . . . ‘pirates’ 
were actually crew members [who] had been taken hostage when their 
Thai fishing boat . . . was hijacked.”154  
Another country that has run into human rights issues regarding pirates 
is Russia. As a party to European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the European Court of Human 
Rights, Russia “has an obligation to safeguard the lives of pirates in its 
custody and accord them due . . . process before sanctioning.”155 There 
have been fishermen in Yemen who have “complain[ed] of increasing[ly] 
aggressive harassment by the [Russian] naval armada, including illegal 
searches and seizures.”156 Those Yemeni fishermen consider the Russian 
“naval forces to be as dangerous as the pirates themselves.”157 The 
Russians were accused of throwing certain pirates overboard by forcing 
them to leave the Russian ship where they were being held and placed on a 
raft on the open seas, which, of course, was a death sentence.
158
  
The numbers of suspected pirate casualties are difficult to ascertain, 
primarily because if a number exists, that statistic has not been released to 
the public.
159
 “Considering the cost and difficulty of prosecuting Somali 
pirates, a country can put pressure on the prosecution to encourage the 
suspects to plead guilty so as to avoid a trial which they would likely lose 
if due process were followed or, once on trial, for the court to deliver a 
guilty verdict so as to avoid or postpone determining repatriation 
issues.”160 “The governments are therefore only offering human rights 
guarantees selectively, as opposed to protecting the inherent rights of 
Somali pirates.”161  
 
 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
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Pirates are under the protection guaranteed by the Convention as soon 
as they are under the effective control of a state naval vessel.
162
 So the 
states must secure for pirates within their jurisdictions the rights and 
freedoms defined in that convention.
163
 For the captured pirates, the 
Convention provides:  
[W]hether the act occurred in Somali waters or on the high seas, can 
thus assert human rights protection/violations under Articles 2 (right 
to life); 3 (prohibition of torture and other forms of inhumane and 
degrading treatment); 5 (right to liberty and security—relating to 
detention); 6 (right to a fair trial); and 7 (due judicial process before 
punishment).
164
 
Once an alleged pirate is captured, he is “within the ‘effective control’ of 
an ECHR contracting party if he is detained by a European navy.”165 The 
ECHR, in Hassan and Others and Medvedyev and Others v. France cases, 
“clarified that the ‘holding’ of pirates by the navies is in contravention of 
Article 5 as it deprives them of their liberty.”166  
However, it is uncertain if ECHR jurisdiction applies if the pirates 
are on board a skiff that is under a naval vessel’s control, with some 
[S]tates like Russia assuming that ECHR jurisdiction therefore does 
not apply. They question how such can apply if ‘control’ was never 
intended for the purpose of arrest but for eventual freedom.
167
 
“The length of time it takes to bring the suspects to trial is an impediment” 
because of the distance travelled from Somalia to France, for example. 
The court came to the conclusion that the naval forces’ failure to allow the 
prisoners the opportunity to contact their “lawyers and relatives was a 
breach of human rights.”168 The navy was also unsuccessful in informing 
“judicial authorities of their actions, thereby violating the French laws.”169 
Article 3 of the ECHR demands an absolute duty to “refrain from 
subjecting a person to inhumane treatment and [to] protect a person from 
 
 
 162. Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supra note 136, at 7–8. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supra note 136, at 8. 
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inhumane treatment.”170 Western states have obligations under the doctrine 
of non-refoulement.
171
 The non-refoulement principle “prohibits the 
expulsion, extradition, deportation, return or otherwise removal of any 
person in any manner whatsoever to a country or territory where the 
person would face a real risk of persecution or serious harm.”172  
In an article, Professor Dubner recently discussed the hiring of Private 
Security Companies (PSC) and the use of armed guards for their 
vessels.
173
 Private armed security guards (PASGs) cannot “board vessels 
and detain[] suspect pirates . . .” but they have been used as an effective 
deterrent—“no ship with PASGs on board has been hijacked.”174 
However, there are various human rights issues that arise when using 
PASGs at sea:  
When can they use force, and to what extent? Who gives the order 
to use force? How can they transport their weapons legally? There 
are also practical questions such as whether using PASGs would 
escalate levels of violence, whether they would make non-guarded 
ships more vulnerable, and whether PSCs should be regulated and 
accredited.
175
 
Professor Dubner’s article went on to state that as of 2012 these PASGs 
have been extremely effective to the point that the amount of piracy off the 
coast of Somalia has dropped to practically nothing.
176
  
As far as the issue of bringing firearms and other weapons into ports, 
PASGs use floating armories off various countries so that they can go on 
board these armories, pick up whatever arms they need, and proceed to the 
ship they are protecting.
177
 When PASGs get off the ship, they are again 
leaving the arms on the flotilla and starting the process over again.
178
 This 
 
 
 170. Id. Article 3 of the ECHR states that: “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” European Convention on Human Rights, art. 3, June 2010, 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 171. Somali Pirates Have Rights Too, supra note 136, at 8. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Barry Hart Dubner & Claudia Pastorius, On the Effectiveness of Private Security Guards on 
Board Merchant Ships Off the Coast of Somalia-Where Is the Piracy? What Are the Legal 
Ramifications?, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1029, 1053 (2014) [hereinafter On the Effectiveness 
of Private Security Guards].  
 174. Thorp, supra note 110. 
 175. Id. 
 176. On the Effectiveness of Private Security Guards, supra note 173, at 1053.  
 177. Sarah Kent & Cassie Werber, How Floating Armories Help Guard Cargo Ships From 
Pirates on High Seas, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-
floating-armories-help-guard-cargo-ships-from-pirates-on-high-seas-1422934573.  
 178. Id. 
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is not to say that it is the only reason that the level of piracy has dropped, 
but it certainly is coincidental.  
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which is a coordinating 
body with twenty government members, started compiling incident reports 
and found that there was a 22 percent jump in armed robbery and pirate 
ships in Asia. This accounted for three-quarters of global maritime piracy 
in the year 2014.
179
 The idea of putting armed guards aboard ships passing 
through the Malacca Strait and nearby waters is a bad one because it 
would increase the dangers to sailors and increase the level of violence 
used by the perpetrators.
180
 When it was decided to use regional patrols 
instead of armed guards aboard the ships ReCAAP had the statistics for 
the drop in piracy off of Somalia, but apparently those statistics did not 
ring true to them. Historically the owners of vessels had serious concerns 
about crewmen killing each other if arms were placed on board. 
The seafarers’ support group, the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian 
Response Programme (MPHRP), has criticized the ECHR’s decision in 
Hassan and Others.
181
 Roy Paul, the program director for the MPHRP, 
said: 
This decision would be unbelievable if it wasn’t made by the 
European Court of Human Rights. The claim that this constituted a 
'violation of their rights to freedom and security' is an insult to the 
seafarers and yachtsmen they attacked as surely this is the true 
violation of the seafarers’ rights to freedom and security. These 
pirates, in my opinion, gave up any of their rights when they set sail 
to attack innocent seafarers who were simply doing their essential 
work.
182
 
It is important to remember that there is a difference between pirates, who 
are considered non-enemy combatants, and terrorists, who are considered 
enemy combatants. Each is treated differently along the procedural avenue 
before trial. A U.S. naval friend of Professor Dubner (hereinafter “X”) said 
that his “overall concern is clearly that this ruling is a great recruiting tool. 
Not only do you get paid to be a pirate, but now, go ahead and get 
 
 
 179. Keith Wallis, Asia Maritime Piracy Attacks Rise to 75 Percent of Global Total, REUTERS, 
Jan. 14, 2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/14/us-asia-piracy-idUSKBN0KN 
10O20150114.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Compensating Pirates Worries IMB, THE MARITIME HUB, Dec. 30, 2014, available at 
https://icc-ccs.org/news/1039-imb-concerned-over-decision-to-compensate-pirates. 
 182. Id. 
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captured, as you’ll earn 10 years worth of annual salary just for being held 
for two days in prison.”183 The opinion of the seafarers’ union 
representative, as well as the author’s naval friend, is the main concern of 
those who believe that the pirates should have little or no rights as 
criminals.  
IV. A MODEST SUGGESTION FOR OBTAINING A SPEEDIER TRIAL WITHOUT 
SO MUCH WEAR AND TEAR ON NAVAL PERSONNEL AND PIRATES 
In 2010, Professor Dubner had a suggestion regarding the most 
efficient way to try pirates; namely, a UN sanction ship that would go out 
on circuit to try pirates.
184
 Currently, with the millions of dollars being 
poured into Somalia and elsewhere in order to create a judicial system and 
proper human jails by the UNODC, there is no reason why this idea could 
not be used to supplement the regional piracy trials in Kenya, Seychelles, 
Mauritius, and elsewhere in the region. In fact, X has told your author that 
he had seen “a couple of coalition ships heading to join the counter-piracy 
mission. The ships are modular and were specifically configured for 
counter-piracy, to include a special brig just for pirates.”185 As he said:  
The setup was very cool to see, a space dedicated to both the guards 
and the pirates. It allowed the cells to be unlocked remotely to give 
access to shower/heads, as well as eating areas, while the guards 
could observe from the other side of a partition. It also had built in 
tear gas and gun ports for any resistance.
186
 
He believed that “these ships were designed to sail back with their 
prisoners, or at least to hold them for extended periods.”187  
The suggestion was also made that there be an agreed upon level of 
sentencing to choose between.
188
 X suggests that designating or assigning 
a ship to be the mobile magistrate for maritime piracy rulings would 
 
 
 183. E-mail from Anonymous to Barry Heart Dubner (Jan. 9, 2015, 12:22 EST) (on file with 
author).  
 184. See Barry H. Dubner & Joseph P. Henn, On Selecting a Judicial System(s) to Try Sea 
Pirates—An Interesting/Necessary Exercise But is it Enough to Deter the Attacks/Hijackings?, 42 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 569, 589 (2011). 
 185. E-mail from Anonymous to Barry Heart Dubner (Jan. 12, 2015, 22:25 EST) (on file with 
author). 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. 
 188. E-mail from Anonymous to Barry Heart Dubner (Jan. 14, 2015, 10:06 EST) (on file with 
author). 
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probably be well received and efficient.
189
 The ship could be a modified 
version of one of the ones that he linked to us or a smaller ship made to 
have a brig, courtroom, and then residences for the staff.
190
 There would 
need to be security escorts for a yacht, while a modified warship would be 
less vulnerable or identifiable.
191
 There would be an EU or NATO 
magistrate that would eliminate the lack of standardization (uniformity) 
and jurisdiction (international waters) concerns.
192
 In this regard each State 
could drop off their prisoners at the ship. They would be tried in the court 
on the ship. If the pirates are found guilty, the court would then arrange to 
have them sent for jailing, fines, or released.
193
 A considered sentence 
might be handed down because the pirate leaders are drawing from people 
who make $100 US per year and, therefore, it would be difficult to 
dissuade them from committing piracy.
194
 On the other hand, punishing 
the bottom of the food chain is not curing the problem. They may prefer to 
get three meals a day in prison and then seek asylum. This, however, is a 
separate issue. 
There is an excellent study by Professor Eugene Kontorovich entitled: 
The Penalties for Piracy. He stated that the paper he prepared was “the 
first global empirical study of the penalties for piracy.”195 He found, in 
part, that the “longest and shortest sentences for similar acts of piracy by 
Somalis spans the entire spectrum of possible jail times, from 4.5 or 5 
years in Kenya, the Netherlands, and Yemen, to life in the U.S. and 
U.A.E.”196 He also found that the mean sentence worldwide was sixteen 
years, “slightly less on a per-defendant basis.”197 He recommended, in 
part: 
In a world of sentencing disparities, the choice of forums made by a 
capturing nation entails a decision about penalties. Thus suspected 
pirates could be transferred “up” the severity gradient. This suggests 
that one previously unappreciated advantage of a dedicated 
international piracy tribunal or chamber would be the elimination of 
 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. E-mail from Anonymous to Barry Heart Dubner (Jan. 14, 2015, 10:06 EST) (on file with 
author).  
 195. Eugene Kontorovich, The Penalties for Piracy: An Empirical Study of National Prosecution 
for International Crime, NW. PUB. L. RESEARCH PAPER NO. 12-16, at 1 (July 10, 2012). 
 196. Id. at 9. 
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sentencing disparities. The creation of such a court was 
recommended by the Report of the Special Adviser to the Security-
General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(S/2011/30).
198
 
He stated, the same thing your author did years ago, that the data presented 
in his study “may lend support to the creation of ‘specialized anti-piracy 
courts,’ as recommended in the Report of the Secretary-General on 
specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other states in the region 
(S/2012/50), which advocates enlisting regional states as prosecution 
centers.”199 
As the reader has observed there are many statistics available as far as 
the number of pirates, their sentences, and other related information. 
However, the UNODC received reports that prison officials in Somalia 
have been receiving bribery payments, and because of those payments 
 
 
 198. Id. at 15. 
 199. Id. Professor Kontorovich also has two appendices, which include sentences by region and 
severity of crime. These are set forth as follows: 
 
Sentences by Region: 
 
Severity of Crime: 
 
Id. at 17–18.  
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sixty convicted pirates were released from prison in Somaliland.
200
 The 
UNODC, since that time, poured a lot of money into Somalia in order to 
create and establish Somalia tribunals, which would serve as a specialized 
system of extra-judicial courts.
201
  
There has always been concern about the “treatment of suspected 
pirates once they are captured.”202 As indicated earlier in the Hassan and 
other case, the ECHR concerns the right to a fair trial; the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment; the non-application of the 
death penalty; and respect of the right of the detainees.
203
 The prosecution 
of children also produces concerns.
204
 One of the main concerns just a few 
years ago was that the current international framework at the time did not 
provide a clear definition of acts of piracy and did not require states to 
criminalize acts of piracy.
205
 That problem has been readily solved by the 
creation of extra-territorial courts placed throughout Seychelles, Kenya, 
and Mauritius. Each of those states, as well as the European states, have 
created piracy statutes, which did not exist on their books, so that the 
pirates could be brought to any of those countries, in the geographic region 
around Somalia, and receive a trial. 
Many serious human rights issues arise when prosecuting pirates 
outside of their home countries.
206
 First, because pirates do not carry legal 
documents the arresting authorities cannot determine by evidentiary proof 
whether they are minors or not.
207
 The second problem regards the 
obtaining of the translations or simultaneous translations of legal 
proceedings from the language in which they are held into the Somali 
language.
208
 Third, when naval officers are witnesses, they often have to 
travel long distances from their ships or their home country to a foreign 
country to testify and are usually restricted from giving militarily sensitive 
evidence.
209
 Fourth, identifying individuals is difficult because fingerprints 
collected from confiscated weaponry of the pirates cannot be matched to 
 
 
 200. Barry H. Dubner & Sara Fredrickson, On the Legal Issues Regarding the Prosecution of Sea 
Pirates (Including Human Rights): A Case of History Repeating Itself?, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
233, 254 (2012).  
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 252. 
 203. Eur, Convention on Human Rights § 1 arts. 3, 5, 6; Protocol No. 6 arts. 1, 2 (June 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  
 204. See id. 
 205. See generally id. 
 206. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, The Law and Economics of International Cooperation 
Against Maritime Piracy, U. CONN. DEP’T ECON. WORKING PAPER SERIES (June 2011). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
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any database.
210
 Finally, interviews are also problematic because it can be 
unclear whether the information gathered was via interrogation without 
proper legal procedure or through voluntary statements.
211
 
The fourth edition of the Best Management Practices directives was 
created to instruct on post-incident evidence preservation and collection.
212
 
“Consistency” and “uniformity” were the main objects of having 
specialized courts in the local regional Station.  
The total cost of prosecuting pirates has been set forth in this article. It 
is exorbitant. Much of the cost is spent on expenses in setting up trials and 
training personnel. “Regionalism” is an excellent idea for both cost and 
human rights reasons. It is much cheaper to try pirates in the local area of 
Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Mauritius then it is to fly them back to 
Europe.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Nations that bring pirates back to their homelands run the risk of not 
following their procedures, which leads the ECHR to release them. The 
pirates face the risk of death because states may not be willing to go 
through the expense of bringing them back to their jurisdiction only to 
have them go free due to human rights violations, as pirates are not treated 
as enemy combatants.  
As was shown earlier, as of 2013, the World Bank estimated the 
economic cost of piracy off the coast of Somalia at $18 billion. This cost is 
acting as a “hidden tax on world trade” and this does not even take into 
account losses to the tourism and fishery industries.
213
  
Even with the use of regional courts, your authors suggest the 
supplemental use of a U.N. flagged vessel; going out on circuit and 
hosting trials. This would avoid, for example, the procedural violations of 
due process, timeliness, and other rights violations. The holdings of the 
ECHR, the Mauritius court, and Danish court demonstrated the need for 
“promptness” of the trials for the pirates. However, this necessary 
requirement is difficult to achieve because of, inter alia, distances, timing, 
witness’ availability, and evidence. It is suggested that regional court trials 
 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 8. 
 212. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Somali 
Natural Resources and Waters, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. S/2011/662 (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. 
Secretary General Somali Report]. 
 213. Maritime Piracy, Part I: An Overview of Trends, Cost, and Trade-Related Implications, 
UNCTAD 14 (2014), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb2013d1_en.pdf. 
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and, where necessary, trials on a U.N. flagged vessel going out on circuit, 
would help avoid violations of due process that lead to human rights 
abuses of alleged pirates.  
While the UNODC is busy attempting to build up the infrastructure of 
Somalia, the other violations of human rights concern “pirate” fishing and 
the dumping of toxic waste by foreign companies off of the 1800-mile 
coast. These issues must be addressed as well.  
Your authors’ fear is that, rather then bringing pirates back to France or 
elsewhere for trial, various authorities will not think it is worth their while 
to bother with the situation. This is because they will be disturbed by the 
fact that these pirates are getting thousands of Euros in compensation after 
receiving millions of Euros worth of ransom money. All of this while 
seafarers are rotting away waiting to be ransomed. The truth of the matter 
is, each civilized country has a system set up to protect the due process of 
their citizens, including murderers, rapists, etc. We would hate to think 
what would happen if these procedures were not followed. The human 
rights of human beings have to be considered.  
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APPENDIX I 
VIOLATIONS BY ARTICLE AND BY STATE—2014214 
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APPENDIX II 
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
215
 
Resolutions of United Nations Security Council  
  
East Africa  
2125 (2013) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia] 
18 November 2013 
2077 (2012) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia] 
21 November 2012 
2020 (2011) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia] 
22 November 2011 
2015 (2011) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of Somalia] 
24 October 2011 
1976 (2011) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of Somalia] 
11 April 2011 
1950 (2010) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia] 
23 November 2010 
1918 (2010) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia] 
27 April 2010 
1897 (2009) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia] 
30 November 2009 
1851 (2008) [on the fight against piracy and armed robbery at 
sea off the coast of Somalia] 
16 December 2008 
1846 (2008) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in territorial waters and the high seas off the coast of 
Somalia] 
2 December 2008 
1844 (2008) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in territorial waters and the high seas off the coast of 
Somalia] 
20 November 2008 
1838 (2008) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in territorial waters and the high seas off the coast of 
Somalia] 
7 October 2008 
1816 (2008) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in territorial waters and the high seas off the coast of 
Somalia] 
2 June 2008 
  
West Africa  
2039 (2012) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea] 
29 February 2012 
2018 (2011) [on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea] 
31 October 2011 
 
 
 215. Maritime Piracy Part II: An Overview of the International Legal Framework and of 
Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Piracy, UNCTAD 64 (2014), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb2013d3_en.pdf. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
250 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:215 
 
 
 
 
  
Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly  
Resolution 67/78, oceans and the law of the sea 18 April 2013 
Resolution 66/231, oceans and the law of the sea 24 December 2011 
Resolution 65/37B, oceans and the law of the sea 5 May 2011 
Resolution 65/37A, oceans and the law of the sea 7 December 2010 
Resolution 64/71, oceans and the law of the sea 4 December 2009 
Resolution 63/111, oceans and the law of the sea 5 December 2008 
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APPENDIX III 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1897
216
 
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Reiterates that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed 
robbery against vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia;  
2. Notes again its concern regarding the findings contained in the 20 
November 2008 report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia (S/2008/769, 
page 55) that escalating ransom payments and the lack of enforcement of 
the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992) are fuelling the 
growth of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and calls upon all States to fully 
cooperate with the Monitoring Group on Somalia;  
3. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that have the 
capacity to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery 
at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution 
and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military 
aircraft and through seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and 
other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting such use;  
4. Commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate coordination in order 
to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in 
cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and the TFG and urges States and 
international organizations to continue to support these efforts;  
5. Acknowledges Somalia’s rights with respect to offshore natural 
resources, including fisheries, in accordance with international law, and 
calls upon States and interested organizations, including the IMO, to 
provide technical assistance to Somalia, including regional authorities, and 
nearby coastal States upon their request to enhance their capacity to ensure 
coastal and maritime security, including combating piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the Somali and nearby coastlines, and stresses the 
importance of coordination in this regard through the CGPCS;  
6. Invites all States and regional organizations fighting piracy off the 
coast of Somalia to conclude special agreements or arrangements with 
countries willing to take custody of pirates in order to embark law 
enforcement officials (“shipriders”) from the latter countries, in particular 
countries in the region, to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of 
persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution 
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for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, 
provided that the advance consent of the TFG is obtained for the exercise 
of third state jurisdiction by shipriders in Somali territorial waters and that 
such agreements or arrangements do not prejudice the effective 
implementation of the SUA Convention;  
7. Encourages Member States to continue to cooperate with the TFG in 
the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role of 
the TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, and decides 
that for a period of twelve months from the date of this resolution to renew 
the authorizations as set out in paragraph 10 of Resolution 1846 (2008) 
and paragraph 6 of Resolution 1851 (2008) granted to States and regional 
organizations cooperating with the TFG in the fight against piracy and 
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance 
notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General;  
8. Affirms that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only 
with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or 
obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law, 
including any rights or obligations under the Convention, with respect to 
any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall 
not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms 
further that such authorizations have been renewed only following the 
receipt of the 2 and 6 November 2009 letters conveying the consent of the 
TFG;  
9. Affirms that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 
(1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 
1425 (2002) do not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for 
the sole use of Member States and regional organizations undertaking 
measures in accordance with paragraph 7 above or to supplies of technical 
assistance to Somalia solely for the purposes set out in paragraphs 5 above 
which have been exempted from those measures in accordance with the 
procedure set out in paragraphs 11 (b) and 12 of resolution 1772 (2007);  
10. Requests that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure 
that the activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in 
paragraph 7 do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the 
right of innocent passage to the ships of any third State;  
11. Calls on Member States to assist Somalia, at the request of the TFG 
and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen capacity in 
Somalia, including regional authorities, to bring to justice those who are 
using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, and stresses that any measures 
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undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable 
international human rights law;  
12. Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, 
States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed 
robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law 
and national legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in 
the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy 
and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, consistent with applicable 
international law including international human rights law, to ensure that 
all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial 
process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing 
disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their 
jurisdiction and control, such as victims and witnesses and persons 
detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution;  
13. Commends in this context the decision by the CGPCS to establish 
an International Trust Fund to support its initiatives and encourages 
donors to contribute to it;  
14. Urges States parties to the Convention and the SUA Convention to 
fully implement their relevant obligations under these Conventions and 
customary international law and cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and 
other States and other international organizations to build judicial capacity 
for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;  
15. Welcomes the revisions by the IMO to its recommendations and 
guidance on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against 
ships, and urges States, in collaboration with the shipping and insurance 
industries, and the IMO, to continue to develop and implement avoidance, 
evasion, and defensive best practices and advisories to take when under 
attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of Somalia, and further 
urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for forensic 
investigation as appropriate at the first port of call immediately following 
an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from 
captivity;  
16. Requests States and regional organizations cooperating with the 
TFG to inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General within nine 
months of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the 
authorizations provided in paragraph 7 above and further requests all 
States contributing through the CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the 
coast of Somalia, including Somalia and other States in the region, to 
report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish jurisdiction and 
cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;  
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17. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council 
within 11 months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation 
of this resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;  
18. Requests the Secretary General of the IMO to brief the Security 
Council on the basis of cases brought to his attention by the agreement of 
all affected coastal States, and duly taking into account the existing 
bilateral and regional cooperative arrangements, on the situation with 
respect to piracy and armed robbery;  
19. Expresses its intention to review the situation and consider, as 
appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 7 above for 
additional periods upon the request of the TFG;  
20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.  
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss2/5
